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LA VIDA DE LA VOLUNTAD
Resumen: Mi trabajo pretende bosquejar una parte de las raíces de la Krisis. Me gustaría mostrar si hay 
realmente una continuidad en la definición de razón práctica y lógica entre los primeros y los últimos 
trabajos de Husserl. En la Krisis, Husserl delimita un significado de razón que se aleja de lo explicado en 
sus primeros escritos éticos y lógicos. Así, para lograr mi objetivo, enfocaré la definición de razón práctica 
y lógica en los cursos sobre ética de 1914 y en los estudios genéticos de 1920. Usaré estos dos trabajos 
porque creo que, con la introducción del método genético y el desarrollo del análisis ético, la pregunta 
por la razón es mejorada, además de modificarse la relación entre razón lógica y práctica. Atendiendo a 
los escritos de Husserl, creo que “la vida” de la voluntad o la estructura de la razón práctica devienen el 
corazón de toda actividad de la razón.
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THE LIFE OF WILL
Abstract: With my work I would like to sketch out a part of the roots of Husserlian Krisis. I would like 
to show if there is really a continuity in the definition of practical and logical reason worked out by 
Husserl between his first and latest works. Indeed, in Krisis Husserl marks out a meaning of reason 
which is far from that elaborated in his first ethical and logical writings. Thus, to attend my purpose, I 
will focus on the definition of practical and logical reason as they come out in ethical lectures of 1914 
and genetic studies of 1920. I will use these two works, because I believe that through the introduction 
of the genetic method and the development of the ethical analysis, the inquiry on reason is improved 
and also the relationship between logical and practical reason has been modified. Following Husserlian 
writings, I believe that the “life” of will or the structure of practical reason becomes the core of every 
activity of reason over the years. 
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THE LIFE OF WILL
INTRODUCTION
Der Zusammenbruch des Glaubens an eine universale Philosophie 
als Führerin des neuen Menschen besagt (…) den Zusammenbruch 
des Glaubens an die “Vernunft“, so verstanden, wie die Alten 
die Episteme der Doxa gegenüber setzen. Sie ist es, die allem 
vermeintlich Seienden, allen Dingen, Werten, Zwecken letztlich 
Sinn gibt, nämlich ihre normative Bezogenheit auf das, was seit den 
Anfängen der Philosophie das Wort Wahrheit –Wahrheit an sich– 
und korrelativ das Wort Seiendes – – bezeichnet. Damit 
fällt auch der Glaube an eine ‘absolute’ Vernunft, aus der die Welt 
ihren Sinn hat (…). Verliert der Mensch diesen Glaube, so (…) er 
verliert den Glauben “an sich selbst“.1
The reason can be considered as one of the most important subjects of Husserlian 
phenomenological research. In this excerpt of Krisis, the reason is described as 
an “instrument of sense”, i. e. as a source of meaning that can give sense to the 
surrounding world and to the man. As the author writes, in the “skeptic deluge” 
only the faith in a science founded on the reason can save our truth, our possibility 
to know and to build our identity. But, comparing these words with those of  the 
ethical writings of 19142, we can see how much Husserlian idea of reason and, 
consequently of science have been modified.  
Through this paper, we would like to show if there is really a continuity in the 
1.HUSSERL, E.: Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale 
Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie, hrsg. von Walter 
Biemel. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954, p. 42.
2.Cf. HUSSERL, E.: Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre, 1908 - 1914, hrsg. von Ulrich Melle. 
The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988, p. 56. (Hereafter  cited as Hua 
XXVIII): “Alle Vernunft ist nur eine, nämlich logische Vernunft ist, und dass somit praktische 
Vernunft und axiologische überhaupt nur ein besonderes Anwendungsgebiet der logischen sind“.
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definition of practical and logical reason elaborated by Husserl during these years.
To attend this aim, we will focus on the meaning of will as it comes out in his 
ethical work elaborated in 19143 and his genetic studies of 1920.4 We will use these 
two groups of researches because we believe that through the introduction of the 
genetic method and the development of ethical analysis the enquiry of reason is 
improved and also the relationship between logical and practical reason is modified. 
1. THE  PARALLELISM OF REASON 
One of the first analytical descriptions of the practical reason can be found in the 
ethical lectures of 1914.5 These ethical lectures, as Melle remarked in his introduction 
to the volume of Husserliana XXVIII, are the systematical result of ethical researches 
carried out by Husserl from 1902.6 In these lectures the practical reason is identified 
above all with the will. The aim of the analysis of will is the realization of the ethical 
project, which consists in the foundation of an ethical science. The ethical project 
is thought within the structure of parallelism. The parallelism represents, in general, 
the structure in which the ethical project is articulated.
Traditionell werden Wahrheit, Gute und Schönheit als koordinierte 
philosophischen Ideen hingestellt und ihnen entsprechende 
parallele normative philosophische Disziplinen angenommen: 
Logik, Ethik, Aesthetic. Diese Parallelisierung hat ihre tiefliegenden 
und nicht hinreichend geklärten Motive, sie birgt in sich große 
philosophische Probleme, denen wir in der Interesse einer 
wissenschaftlichen Be gründung der Ethik [...] nachgehen wollen.7  
In the ethical project we cannot find a traditional kind of ethics. We are agree with 
3.The first description of the ethical project elaborated by Husserl is around 1902 in 
Vorlesungen über Grundfragen zur Ethik und Wertlehre and it is developed systematically 
on three occasion: in Vorlesungen über Ethik of 1908-09, 1911 and 1914. About the 
genesis of this project is possible to look up Letter of Husserl to Meinong the April 5 1902 
(Briefwechsel, hrsg. von Karl Schuhmann. The Hague; Netherlands: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1994, Bd. I, p. 145 ), Idee I, footnote 1, p. 219 and HUSSERL, E.: Formale und 
transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft, hrsg. von Paul Janssen. 
The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974, footnote 1, p. 142.
4.We will refer above all to: HUSSERL, E.: Aktive Synthesen: Aus der Vorlesung 
“Transzendentale Logik” 1920/21 Ergänzungsband zu “Analysen zur passiven Synthesis”, 
hrsg. von Roland Breeur. The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000, pp. 
9-10, (hereafter cited as Hua XXXI). 
5.The most important volumes of Husserliana published about this project are volumes 
XXVIII and XXXVII. 
6.MELLE, U.: Introduction to Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre, 1908 - 1914, hrsg. 
von Ulrich Melle. The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988, p. XXIII, 
(hereafter cited as Hua XXVIII).
7.Hua XXVIII,  p. 3. 
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what Nenon wrote about Husserlian ethics: “It is not a traditional form of ethics, 
but above all a theoretical analysis of it”.8 Indeed Husserlian ethical project consists 
in the foundation of an ethical science and its realization is strictly connected to 
the logical project. The ethical project consists in the enquiry of the idea of good, 
that the “philosophical tradition” posed on the same stage of the idea of truth. 
Thanks to the model of philosophical tradition, Husserl seeks to found an ethical 
science through the analysis of the idea of good and its rational fundament. In 
substance, Husserl wants to become an “Aristoteles der reinen Ethik”9, making 
ethics a science analogous with logic. But he wants to avoid to fall in the same error 
of Aristotle, that is leaving out the idea of good in virtue of that of truth. Following 
the philosopher, it is necessary to go through both terms of parallelism, in order to 
recognize the rational fundament of a possible ethical science. The ideas of truth 
and good are possible fundaments of normative disciplines because these ideas 
are the correlatives objects of modes (Arten) of a rational consciousness. 
Nevertheless in this work Husserl falls in a contradiction, because he writes that: 
“Alle Vernunft ist nur eine, nämlich logische Vernunft ist, und dass somit praktische 
Vernunft (…) nur ein besonderes Anwendungsgebiet der logischen sind“.10 While, in 
these lines Husserl describes the rationality of consciousness as a logical rationality, 
in his project, proposed in the same lectures, the rationality of consciousness is 
explained as a rational core of many different kinds of reason. He said in fact that it is 
possible a parallelism between the logical and the practical reason of consciousness 
and respectively “nach der Parallelen der Akt- und Vernunftenarten auf welche 
diese Disziplinen wesentlich zurückbezogen sind”.11 If we go through the structure 
of parallelism of consciousness, we can see that it is described in this way:
Geht man nun den Parallelen von Logik und Ethik nach bzw. der 
Parallele der Akt- und Vernunftarten, auf welche diese Disziplinen 
wesentlich zurückbezogen sind, der urteilende Vernunft auf der 
einen Seite, der praktischen Vernunft auf der anderen, so drängt 
sich der Gedanke auf, dass nun auch Logik in dem bestimmt und 
eng Sinn einer formal Logik als Parallele entsprechen muss eine 
in analogem Sinn formale und ebenfalls apriorische Praktik (…) 
Sowie Zeit übrig bleibt, soll dann auf die großen Problemgruppen 
der Phänomenologie und Kritik der Vernunft eingegangen werden, 
die sich nach diesen radikalen formalen Disziplinen orientieren.12 
8.NENON, T.: Willing and Acting in Husserl’s Lectures on Ethics and Values Theory. 
Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990.
9.HUSSERL, E.: Einleitung in die Ethik 1920-1924, hrsg. von Hennig Peucker. Dordrecht/
Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004, p. 31, (from now on shorten with Hua 
XXXVII).
10.Hua XXVIII, p. 56.
11.Ivi, p. 3.
12.HUSSERL, E.: Aufsätze und Vorträge(1911-1921), hrsg. von Thomas Nenon und Hans 
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Namely, in this excerpt consciousness is not only a logical consciousness, but it is a 
rational unity composed by logical and practical reason. These forms of reason are 
the rational fundament of the ideas of truth and good and correspond to the skill 
of consciousness of knowing and of willing. Consciousness is a rational unity that 
changes its structure following its object of interest (it can be a logical, practical or 
axiological consciousness). 
The definition of will is parallel to the definition of logical reason elaborated by 
Husserl in his ethical and logical researches. In the ethical lectures of 1914 Husserl 
introduces the definition of will through the symmetrical parallelism between 
logical and practical reason. 
This parallelism represents the structure which is at the basis of the interaction 
between consciousness and world: every position (Setzung) of consciousness has 
some correspondences into a specific kind of reason. If the consciousness knows 
the reality, it uses the logical reason, if it values it, it uses the axiological reason, if 
it perceives it, it uses the aesthetical reason and so on. All of these forms of reason 
are parallel each others and their balance in the mundane application is possible 
just thanks to the structure of parallelism which keeps them at the same time 
together and separated. 
This different modes of reason are, as well, the rational fundament of many 
scientific disciplines: the logical reason is the rational fundament of logical science 
and at the same way the practical reason should be the rational fundament of the 
ethical science. Then the practical reason defined by Husserl as a rational willing, 
is the rational fundament of an ethical science and this last is parallel to the logical 
science and to its rational fundament.13
We think that Husserl falls in a contradiction about his definition of the rationality 
of consciousness, because in the ethical lectures of 1914 he is still deeply linked 
to the work of Logische Untersuchungen.14 He wants to found an ethical science 
which is as pure and universal as the logic described in his logical investigations. 
But it is necessary to stress that in this set the parallelism between logical and 
practical reason is not so symmetrical. If the logical reason is, as he wrote, the 
reason of Wissenschaftslehre15, it does not leave room for a pure practical reason. 
Rainer Sepp. The Hague: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1987, p. 197.
13.See: Hua XXVIII, pp. 3-11; pp. 102-140.
14.See: Hua XXVIII, p. 3: “Im wesentlichen haben wir dabei kurz an die Ausführungen 
zu erinneren, die ich schon in ersten Band meiner Logische Untersuchungen, in die 
Prolegomena zur reinen Logik gegeben (…) habe”.
15.HUSSERL, E.: Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Teil. Prolegomena zur reinen Logik. Text 
der 1. und der 2. Auflage. Halle: 1900, rev. Ed. 1913, hrsg. von Elmar Holstein. The Hague: 
Martinus, § 5, (hereafter cited as  XVIII). 
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Indeed, in the ethical lectures of 1914 the logical reason is considered a more 
important reason than the ethical one. Husserl defined it as a reason with 
“Allwirksamkeit”16 and he described practical reason as a servant of logical 
reason everywhere.17 
2. THE DEFINITION OF WILL IN 1914
In his Husserls Phänomenologie des Willens, Melle18 shows the main subjects of 
Husserlian analysis of will19 and he describes also the philosophical influences that 
affected Husserl in the progression of his work. Namely, he refers to the work of 
James20 and Ehrenfels.21 According to the first philosopher the main characteristic 
of will is the attention and its fiat, that is the “act of mental consent”. For Ehrenfels 
the act of will cannot be a founding act, because it is just a pretension (Forderung) 
of something and thus it needs the representative acts of logical reason. 
The description of will of 1914 is under these influences. It is considered as a 
parallel modalization of consciousness. It represents that capacity of consciousness 
of willing or doing something. It is described as a logical act that belongs to the 
realm of operating. Its distinctive characteristic is that of “fiat!” or in German “es 
werde!”.22 The consciousness of will is a creative consciousness. It pronounces its 
creative fiat and, thanks to this, a new form of reality is created. The thesis of will 
(Willensthesis) is a position of realization and creation. 
It can be thought also as a specific kind of reason that assumes different 
characteristics according to the way of being of consciousness. As it was for 
judgments, for volitions too there are different kinds of expression. 
“Für alle Abwandlungen des Urteilsbewußtseins finden wir so und apriori parallele 
Abwandlungen des Willensbewußtseins“.23 
It is possible, in fact, that we can want something with conviction or doubt, with 
desire or fear or with many more expressions. And these correspond to the different 
16.Hua XXVIII, p. 58.
17.See: Ivi, pp. 61-65. 
18.MELLE, U.: Husserls Phänomenologie des Willens, Tijdschrift voor filosofie, vol 54, num. 
2, pp. 280-305. 
19.The subjects are: Die Fundierung des �ollens, Die Arten des �ollens, “Die W W
Willenobjektivitäten, das Verhältnis von Wille und Tendenz”. In our work we will focus 
above all on the second and the last subject.
20.JAMES, �.: W Principles of Mental Psychology, vol. 1. New York: Dover Publications, 
1950, p. 560.
21.Chr. EHRENFELS: Uber Fühlen und Wollen. �ien, 1887, p. 75.
22.See: Hua XXVIII, p. 107.
23.Ivi, p. 115.
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modalities of judgments, such as for example those of assertions or questions 
and so on. There are a great number of apriori rational expressions for will and 
logical reason of everyone. They represent all the possible cases that the will and 
the logical reason has to exist in the relative “man-world” context: the absolute 
rationality of these two remains the same as though they realize themselves in a 
human and relative context.  
But these apriori and rational structures can work only with the support of a logical 
reason. The practical reason is not always parallel to the logical one, because it 
depends on this first.  
(...) sind Wollungen wieder fundiert durch doxischen Thesen und 
zugleich durch Thesen der Sphäre der Wertungen. Fundierte Thesen 
haben nicht nur Richtigkeit überhaupt und in dem Sinn, daß sie ihre 
doxische, axiologische, praktische Wahrheit bzw. Unwahrheit habe, 
sondern sie ‘richten’ sich auch nach ihren Fundament-Thesen.24
Following Husserl: it is necessary the help of the logical reason, to make possible an 
act of will. Indeed, it is necessary to know something, in order to refer to something. 
Consequently it is necessary to have a representation of an object, in order to will 
it. The reason of willing is strictly linked up to the reason of thinking, because we 
cannot do anything if we do not know the things toward which we act. 
Dabei setzt jeder Wille nicht nur überhaupt Vorstellung des 
Gewollten voraus, sondern er hat notwendig eine umfassende 
Vorstellungsunterlage und (…) das Gewollte auch eine 
Glaubensunterlage bezogen auf reales Sein.25 
When we want something, we have to represent and know our object. The will 
depends necessarily on the logical reason both for the expression of its intentions 
and for its realization. In this set the definition of will is in harmony with that 
used in the first and second edition of  Logische Untersuchungen.26 Here in fact, 
Husserl wrote that there is not a parallelism between logical and practical reason, 
because the second depends on the first in its pure and rational activity. This is not 
completely an intentional kind of reason27, because its acts are not objectivating 
acts able to represent its object. It refers to its objects usually in an impulsive or 
instinctive way.28 
The realization of will is, in fact, reliant on the logical reason and on its predicative 
24.Ivi, p. 127
25.Ivi, p. 109.
26.Hua XIX, p. 382.
27.Hua XIX, p. 367.
28.Hua XXVII, p. 63.
The life of will    55
or representative “voice”.29 Without the representations of predicative reason, 
the will could not represent the objects of its volitions to itself. Thus the reason 
of pure consciousness is just a logical reason. The practical reason is just a 
psychological reason that can be purely rational only with the “objectivating” 
help of the logical reason. In this set Husserl can conceive the logical science still 
as a Wissenschaftslehre that does not leave any possibility for a parallelism and 
consequently for the realization of the ethical project.
Yet, after 1914 the definition of will develops a more autonomous feature. Maybe 
this is due to the ambition of Husserl of being “an Aristotle of pure ethics”. After 
those years, the will becomes more independent and important in regard to the 
functioning of every form of reason. Husserl seems to discover in it some elements 
essential for the realization of logical acts. We think that through the help of 
genetic method is put in evidence the relation between the passive and active life 
of reason. At the basis of active life of logical reason there is, in fact, the passive 
and active life of will. Therefore the practical reason seems to be not only the 
fundament of the practical acts but also of the logical acts. 
3. THE DEFINITION OF WILL IN 1920 
According to the Husserlian thought there are two phenomenological methods that 
can be helpful to the scientific research: static and genetic method.30 These two 
methods are different each other. Static phenomenology consists in a certain way, 
in a descriptive phenomenology, that has to go through the essential contents of the 
consciousness. Genetics phenomenology is a form of explicative phenomenology 
which clarifies the genesis of the objects following their constitutive laws.31 
Husserl puts near to the previous static or descriptive phenomenology a genetic 
phenomenology. While the first has the task to describe the pure reason of 
consciousness as it is, the second has the aim of explaining the development of 
rational process. Genetic phenomenology has, in substance, the purpose of making 
clear the reality according to its fieri, following the typical phenomenological 
movement to go back zu den Sachen selbst. 
The description of will, elaborated by Husserl after the introduction of genetic 
method, maintains a link with what had been conceived in the previous works and 
29.Ivi, p. 69.
30.As it concerns the exact date of the introduction of genetic phenomenology, we could 
say that it is difficult to find a specific moment. We can say that the signs of evolution of 
method are visible since 1913 in the modified use of term genesis in the third note of 
Logische Untersuchungen (1913), or, in a more evident way, in the method of enquiry used 
in Analysen zur passiven Synthesis (1913-20 / 1918-26). 
31.HUSSERL, E.: Metodo fenomenologico statico e genetico (1921), tr. it. Milano Vergani: 
Il Saggiatore, 2003, p. 57. 
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at the same time it introduces new important elements. As it was in the lectures of 
1914, “Der �ille ist kein bloßes Begehren; er gehört in die allgemeiner Sphäre der 
reinen Aktivität”.32 But, differently from 1914, it cannot be considered just as a 
practical act. It has not need for the act of representation of logical reason to exist 
and to comply itself from a phenomenological or a pure point of view. 
Der Begriff “Wille“ ist manchmal so weit genommen worden, dass jede Ichaktivität, 
also jedes tätige Vorstellen, Fühlen usw. darunter befasst wurde, also Aufmerksamkeit 
als Willensbetätigung gefasst wurdet.33 
Commonly, the will can be posed at the same stage of every form of activity of 
ego. It can be even confused with the practical act of representation that, as we 
saw before, belongs to the realm of logical reason. But the concept of will has not 
to be extended on every form of activity of consciousness because, namely, it is 
at the basis of every rational activity. It is not within the rational activity, but it is 
its first step. Following Husserlian analysis, the will is the constitutive part of every 
kind of rational and irrational act. 
This is due to the key concept of attention (Aufmerksamkeit). The attention is not 
the result of will but it is rather its motor. The attention is that form of tension 
which let the dynamis of act become a real act. It let the will be dynamis of the 
action, because it is thanks to the attention that the will can receive the elements 
of reality and decide to do something in a certain way. While in  the second 
edition of Logische Untersuchungen, attention was not a function of practical 
reason and it was not properly a pure component of act because it was just a part 
of the complex acts.34 Here it is considered as an important part of the practical act 
and it is the essential key of the practical connection between subject and world. 
Husserl stresses that the concept of will was considered in a “so large way” that 
any reference to the attention was put aside. On the contrary, every act of will is 
distinguished from the others acts thanks to the attention and to the particular kind 
of activity it gives rise to. 
Der prägnante und eigentliche Begriff von Willen bezeichnet aber 
nur eine besondere sich verbreitet, sofern alle Aktivität in Form 
willkürlicher Aktivität auftreten kann.35 
The will continues to be a specific aspect of rational activity of consciousness, not 
only as its modalization, but above all as its requirement. It is a particular activity 
which involves aware and discretionary acts of pure reason of ego. 
32.Hua XXXI, p. 10.
33.Ibidem.
34.See: Hua XIX, V LU, § 19.
35.Hua XXXI, p. 10.
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Es will mir immermehr scheinen, dass Wille nicht eine eigene 
Weise des Bewusstseins ist, sondern eine besondere und höhere 
Form der Aktivität, die unter gewissen Wesensbedingungen, die in 
vorausgesetzten Objektivierungen und Fühlungen liegen, überall 
auftreten kann.36 
The will represents a “particular and superior” aspect of rational activity of 
consciousness and it can “come into play” under certain conditions. These 
conditions coincide with those of 1914, namely with those representations 
of objects that the acts have to assume for acting. But differently from 1914, 
these rational logical conditions are not here the necessary presuppositions of 
the existence of willing. On the contrary, the activity of will is considered as a 
particular and superior kind of rational action. The clarification of the sense 
of this particularity and superiority in the activity of consciousness is possible 
through the analysis of the key concept of attention. In fact, it is a specific 
component of will which makes the will active and superior respect to the other 
forms of activity of reason.
According to the results of genetic phenomenological analysis the activity of 
will is possible because of the attention. The attention is a positive (from Greek
: an act of creation from something of already existent) feeling, or better it 
is an act that makes the interest something of real. This feeling transforms a simple 
act of perception in interest just because it puts in the perception the tension to 
be in the things we perceive. The interest then, thanks to its specific tension aimed 
“ad” or to an aim, changes into an act of will. As it was in the psychology of James, 
the tension of attention can be at a first stage an instrument for the interest and at a 
second stage an instrument for the will. It can transform the perception in interest 
and the interest in will. It adds, in fact, to the interest “the tension” which unifies 
the ego to the object of perception and the will to its productive characteristic (its 
capability to modify the reality and to produce new reality through its intention 
specifically aimed). Thanks to this double form of attention (passive tension and 
ad-tension) the simple act of perception becomes an act of interest or active will. 
Consequently we could say that the will is composed both by attention and 
interest. These two components are linked each others and are articulated in two 
essential stages: passive and active. Both attention and interest can work on the 
two stages. Only in the active stage the activity of interest and attention give rise 
to the acts of will. Differently from the lectures of 1914 the act of will does not 
require the representations of logical reason to be effective. On the contrary, as 
Husserl wrote in his manuscript, “the reason is always a practical reason and it is 
servant of will”.37  The will is independent from any kind of logical reason because 
36.Ibidem.
37.E. Husserl, Ms. E III, 7, 85.
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its components do not need any kind of activity. The will is itself a primitive form of 
action and it is disclosed through the genetic analysis. The link between interesting 
and perception is the first step of any form of knowledge. The will is “superior and 
particular” because it is at the basis of all kinds of acts, the logical acts too. Indeed, 
it is necessary the passive interest of perception and the active interest of knowing, 
to know any object .38
This first step is not a real form of knowledge but a “will to know”. The true 
knowledge consists in the productive action of the ego. The logical reason can be 
really directed to the knowledge only if the will realizes itself in the will of doing.
The will, then, is a particular and superior faculty with respect to the other kinds of 
reason because it is the first and unavoidable stage of epistemological interaction 
between man and the world. It is not simply a form of parallel reason to the 
logical reason, but it is the first layer of logical activities. As Nam-In Lee wrote, 
every intentionality should be regarded as a practical intentionality.39 Because 
every act of consciousness is always a practical act. The interior components 
of will (interest and attention) are the proofs of its primate in the process of 
knowledge. We need to have or perceive an object, in order to know or to think 
it: this is the first and unavoidable step of the relation with the world. This is the 
first kind of interaction with the world. The ground of doxa is possible thanks to 
the practical acting of the ego. The aware of the world in the way of the doxa is 
possible through the passive background generated by will. 
As Hart remarked just the will can put in light all the contents of the other kinds 
of reason.40 The theoretical reason does not understand its representations if it 
does not reflect on them. And the act of refection is the result of  the fiat of will. 
As Husserl wrote “every act is an act of will”.41 Every kind of reason is firstly a 
practical reason because only through an action of will we can have an activity of 
reason. The will is the function that is in charge of every kind of activity.42 It is that 
particular and superior dynamis that can transform the dynamis self in act, in the 
act of judgment too. 
The predicative activity of logical reason is still necessary to give voice to the 
reality we know, but differently from 1914 the process of communication between 
consciousness and the world is not due to logical reason but to the reason of will. 
38.See: HUSSERL, E.: Erfahrung und Urteil Untesuchungen zur Genalogie der Logik, Hrsg. 
Von L. Landgrebe. Hamburg: Claassen & Goverts, 1948, §47. 
39.LEE, N.: “Practical Intentionality and Transcendental Phenomenology as a Practical 
Philosophy”, Husserl Studies, 17, num. 1 (2000), pp. 49-63.
40.HART, J.: “Person and Common Life”, in Phaenomenologica 126, Dordrecht/ Boston/
London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
41.HUSSERL, E.: Ms  A V, 22, 5.
42.See: Ivi, §78.
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Even if the role of logical reason is always essential to make possible the expression 
of what we know, it is the reason of will that gives the point of starting to the logical 
reason for its activity.
Thus the parallelism between logical and practical reason not is still asymmetrical 
because every kind of reason is always a practical reason and, consequently, 
every kind of science is always a practical science that has its rational root in 
the life of will and in its Lebenswelt. The project of a scientific foundation of 
ethics and the introduction of genetic method led Husserl to modify his 
definition of practical reason. Thus in the work of Krisis the practical reason is 
the main subject of our knowledge and this reason has the duty of giving sense 
in skeptic deluge of our knowledge. We think that the difference between the 
description of reason, namely of logical and practical reason, over these years is 
affected by the ethical researches and the introduction of the genetic method. 
CONCLUSION
We could conclude that genetic method and the ethical project affect the 
husserlian definition of rationality. There is a modification of meaning of reason 
from 1914 to 1930. In this period the practical reason becomes a more and more 
important form of reason. If following the model of Logische Untersuchungen, the 
practical reason was not a pure reason of consciousness and it depended on the 
representations of logical reason to comply their acts, after genetic and ethical 
studies it becomes the first component of every rational act. The will becomes a 
form of “superior and particular” reason because, as Husserl says, “every reason 
is a practical reason”. Interest and attention have been described, as components 
of will, and as a necessary layer for every activity of reason. Every form of reason, 
in fact, expresses itself through activity and the activity is moved just by the 
components of will. The will is not “any kind of activity” but it is the first layer of 
any activity.  Thus, a logical act is not only a logical act but it is an unit of activity 
of willing and thinking.
